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cou 
for post-conviction relief. 
In November 11, Corporal ins of the Idaho Police 
was dispatched to a two 
head-on d one vehicles, Jory 
Twitchell, was killed in the accident. .) The driver of the other vehicle, Marc 
Klein, was transported to an area hospital. 1-2.) Blood drawn from Klein 
revealed a of .279. (Exhibit J7.) 
The state charged Klein with felony vehicular and 
misdemeanor driving under the influence (excessive). (Exhibit J9.) The Idaho 
State Police completed two accident reconstruction reports one by Cpl. Allen W. 
Bivins, which was approved by Cpl. Fred Rice, and a second by Cpl. Rice 
himself. (Plaintiff's exhibits 2, 3.) Both Bivins and Rice concluded that the 
accident occurred when Klein crossed into Twitchell's lane of travel. (!d.) 
1 The Idaho Supreme Court granted Klein's motion to augment the record with 
documents from the underlying criminal case (exhibits J1 - J18). (10/11/13 
Order.) These documents were also admitted as exhibits in the post-conviction 
case. (R., Vol. II, pp.201-203.) 
1 
11 .) 
a 
P.3d 727 conviction 
conclud 
that Cpl. testimony at 
he g was in 
case, and that he should therefore be permitted to withdraw his plea. (Exhibit 
J 13.) The district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the 
motion because Klein's conviction had already become final. (Exhibits J 16, J 17); 
also State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 354-356, 79 P.3d 711, 71 15 (2013) 
(holding that where a defendant does not appeal a judgment of conviction, the 
district court's jurisdiction to set aside the conviction ends 42 days after the 
defendant is sentenced). 
2 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (holding that there are no 
constitutional barriers to prevent a judge from accepting a guilty plea from a 
defendant who chooses not to admit factual guilt). 
2 
a , Vol. I, .1 ) 
(1 ) a =':"::::=-.:::...L violation by to 
d impeachment evidence cred reliabiiity Cpl. 
Klein's counsel was ineffective for failing to timely file a motion to 
his guiity plea; and (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
conduct an independent investigation of the accident or to adequately consult 
with an independent accident reconstructionist. (Id.) 
The district court summarily dismissed Klein's first and second post-
conviction claims, but ordered an evidentiary hearing on the third. (R, Vol. II, 
pp.204-217.) Following the evidentiary hearing, at which Klein and his trial 
counsel testified, district court denied K!ein's third claim. (Tr., pp.44-106; R, 
Vol. II, pp.242-250.) timely appealed. (R Vol. II, pp.251-255.) 
3 Brady v. Maryland, 837 U.S. 83 (1963). 
3 
counsel failed conduct 
uately consult 
reconstructionist? 
on 
an 
as: 
1. Has Klein failed to show that the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing his Brady post-conviction claim? 
2. Has Klein failed to show that the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing his post-conviction claim that his trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to move to withdraw his plea? 
3. Has Klein failed to show that the district court erred in denying, after an 
evidentiary hearing, his post-conviction claim that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to adequately investigate the accident? 
4 
post -conviction 
impeachment 
(Appellant's brief, 
the district court erred in 
state committed a =-'-"::..=:...J- violation by withholding 
regarding the 
.9-15,) Klein's 
ibility and reliability Cpl. 
for any of alternative 
reasons. any "evidence" regarding the ElIinqton case and pending appeal 
in which Cpl. Fred Rice's credibility was challenged constituted at most, 
impeachment evidence, which the had no duty to disclose prior to its 
Klein. Second, Klein has failed establish prejudice as 
result of any lack of disclosure. Third, the Custer County prosecutor's office did 
not have the duty to disclose the challenges to CpL Rice's credibility in the 
Ellington case and pending appeal because such information was not in its 
control prior to Klein's guilty plea. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact 
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file .... " Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518,523, 164 P.3d 798,803 
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76,80,57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
5 
1 
eiement of 
164 P.3d 798, 
(2003) 
a claim 
evidence 
1 at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. 
1, 
I.C. § 1 
Due process requires the prosecution to disclose to the defense all 
exculpatory evidence known to the state or in its possession. Brady v. Maryland, 
837 U.S. 83 (1963). When there has been a conviction after tria!, a Brady 
violation is found if the defendant can show: (1) that the evidence was 
exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that the evidence was suppressed by the state; 
and (3) materiality (Le. prejudice). State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 380, 247 
P.3d 582, 607 (2010) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)). 
However, "the United States Constitution does not require the State to 
disclose material impeachment information prior to entering a plea agreement 
with the defendant" Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 64,105 P.3d 376,390 (2004) 
(emphasis added) (citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002)). This 
6 
is a 
p, 
, 507 (1 st CiL 201 teaches that Brady 
against the ice that ensue from loss of an 
opportunity to plea-bargain with complete knowledge of all relevant facts. This 
good sense: when a defendant chooses to admit his guilt, Brady concerns 
") 
1, The State Is Not Required To Disclose Impeachment Evidence Prior 
To Plea Negotiations 
Impeachment evidence is that which is designed to discredit a witness, i.e. 
uce the effectiveness his testimony by bringing evidence which 
explains why the jury should not put faith in him or his testimony, State v, Marsh, 
141 Idaho 862, 868-869, 119 P3d 637, 643-644 (Ct App. 2004). Exculpatory 
evidence relates to a defendant's guilt or innocence. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 
772, 781, 984 P.2d 127, 136 (1997). As discussed above, a state has no duty to 
disclose evidence which is merely impeaching, and not exculpatory, prior to a 
defendant's guilty plea. Ruiz, 536 U.S, at 629. 
In this case, as the district court correctly recognized (R. Vol, II, pp.211-
213), evidence regarding the challenge to CpL Rice's credibility in the Ellington 
case and pending appeal constituted, at most, impeachment evidence. The 
challenge to Cpl. Rice's credibility did not constitute exculpatory evidence 
because it did not relate to Klein's guilt or factual innocence to the felony 
7 
only 
it 
1 ing is 
we are first time on ") 
, even if is Court 
any standing for the a to 
potential impeachment evidence prior to a defendant's entry of an Alford plea. To 
the contrary, the distinction drawn in Ruiz regarding when a state has a duty to 
disclose material impeachment evidence was not based upon the nature of the 
guilty plea, but upon whether a plea agreement has been reached, i.e. whether 
there was a trial. See Ruiz, 536 U at 623 (concluding "that the Constitution 
does not require the Government to disclose material impeachment evidence 
prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendanf' (emphasis added)). 
As discussed above, this is because impeachment evidence "is special in relation 
to the fairness of a trial not in respect to whether a plea is voluntary" DunlaQ, 
141 Idaho at 64,106 P3d at 390 (emphasis in original) (quoting Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 
629). A defendant who enters an Alford plea waives the right to a trial, the 
8 
to a 
also 
(2012), Sixth 
counsel to negotiations, narrowed the holding of 
cou would be rendered 
upon a "full understanding of 
including 
Court opinions 
566 U.S. 
of 
because "the right to 
counsel's 
prosecutor's case," 
p.14.) the 
performance of trial counsel with regard to plea negotiations may now be 
evaluated by the courts under the Sixth Amendment, it does not follow that 
counsel must therefore be entitled to the disclosure of potential impeachment 
evidence that they were not entitled to before. Pursuant to ~ and Lafler, the 
effectiveness of counsel's performance during plea negotiations may simply be 
evaluated based on the circumstances and the information actually available to 
counsel at the time. 
As in Ruiz, Klein's guilty plea precludes a Brady challenge based on 
impeachment evidence. Because evidence regarding the challenge to Cpl. 
Rice's credibility in Ellington was not exculpatory, but was merely impeaching, the 
state did not have a duty to disclose it prior to entering into a plea agreement with 
9 
2 
was not 
awareness 
is 
going 144 415,41 P.3d 
797 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428,436,885 P.2d 1144, 
1152 (Ct. App. 1994). In making this determination, the court will "employ an 
objective assessment, based in part on the persuasiveness of the withheld 
information as to whether the particular defendant and his counsel would have 
insisted on going to triaL" Roeder, 144 Idaho at 418-419, 162 P.3d at 797-798. 
The court will not consider a defendant's subjective statements that he would not 
have pled guilty had he known of the information. ~ at 419, 162 P.3d at 798. 
The court must also consider any objective motivations a defendant may have 
had for pleading guilty. Gardner, 126 Idaho at 436-437,885 P.2d at 1152-1153. 
"Any derived by the defendant from guilty plea is a significant factor 
10 
as a 
Klein's 
he has 
has failed to show that but for the failure 
, that a reasonable 
to 
direct court correctly 
to Cpi. 
to Klein at a potential trial. The 
in his position would 
(R., Vol. II, p.210), any 
In would 
'=':":':.:..c...;;;L.=-:"':' 
simply not to 
little use 
Cpl. Rice 
or his The possessed the separate 
completed by Cpl. Bivins, which also found that Klein caused the accident by 
passing into Twichell's lane of travel. (Petitioner's exhibit 3.) 
Further, it is clear that Klein received the benefit of a favorable plea 
bargain. In exchange for Klein's guilty plea to felony vehicular manslaughter, the 
state agreed to dismiss an excessive driving under the influence charge, and to 
recommend that the district court impose a six-year unified sentence with three 
years fixed. (See R., Vol. II, p.205.) As Klein's counsel testified at the evidentiary 
hearing, at the time Klein decided to plead guilty, he was "tired of being in [the) 
Custer County Jail, and "wanted to get on with things." (Tr., p.74, Ls.2-5.) Klein 
testified that at the time, he felt the plea agreement was fair. (Tr., p.93, L.23 -
p.94, L.2.) Though Klein may have been unhappy with the lengthier sentence 
11 
good 
id 
an on 
case was 
in own 
J 1), 
is case. 
drawn from 
3, 
as 
the area of impact. (ld.) Following the accident, Klein told investigating officers 
that was "fucked" and that he "really screwed up this time." (Id., p.8.) Klein 
also asked a bystander at the scene of the accident if he was the person he had 
hit. (Id., p.g.) 
Even if the district court erred in conclud that state had no duty to 
disclose challenge to Cpl. Rice's credibility in the Ellington case prior to the 
entry of Klein's guilty plea, Klein has still failed to show that the district court erred 
in summarily dismissing post-conviction petition claim, because has failed 
to show ice from iack of disclosure. 
12 
3. 
m 
or 
in case, 
S. 419, 437 (1 Thus, to prevail, 
was possessed by a district's 
and prosecutorial personnel." 
285 F.3d 1 1, 1309 (11 th Cir. 2002) (internal q 
F.3d 15, 20 (1 51 Cir. extends to 
eXCUlpatory material "possessed by prosecution or agents"). 
d to disclose does not extend to "other government that have no 
in investigation or prosecution at issue." 
399 F.3d 197, 216 (3rd Cir. 2005) {internal quotations 
At the time of Klein's guilty plea, there had been no judicial determination 
that Cpl. Rice testified falsely at Ellington's trial. In denying Ellington's motion for 
a new trial approximately a year and a half before Klein was arrested, the 
Kootenai County district court expressed "some concern" about Cpl. Rice's 
integrity, but acknowledged that it was "difficult to conclude that [Cpl. Rice] 
intentionally or carelessly attempted to mislead the Ellington jury." (R., Vol. I, 
p.43.) It also found that the defense merely "pointed out a valid basis upon why 
they might be able to impeach the testimony of Rice." (Id.) The state disputed 
Ellington's allegation that Cpl. Rice testified inconsistently or dishonestly at 
Ellington's trial. (See Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727.) Therefore, the 
"evidence" Klein asserts the state should have been disclosed essentially 
13 
4 n 
=~;..;;;..;c.;.case ing was just as 
as it was Custer County 
had no duty of 
in =.:.;.;~~ case. 
Klein has failed to show that the state committed a Brady violation in 
failing to inform him of the challenge to CpL Rice's credibility in the case 
pending appeal. The state is not required to disclose impeachment evidence 
prior to entering into a plea agreement with a defendant, Klein was not prejudiced 
by any lack of disclosure, and the existence of the pending Ellington appeal was 
not evidence "possessed by or known to" the Custer County prosecutor's office 
or its agents. For any and each any of these alternative reasons, Klein has failed 
to show that the district court in summarily dismissing this 
4 Neither Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in nor Kootenai County 
district court's memorandum decision denying Ellington's motion for a new trial 
made any reference to Cpl. either testifying at any hearing on Ellington's 
motion for a new trial, or being otherwise involved in the post-trial proceedings in 
that case. See Ellington, 151 Idaho 53,253 P.3d 727; (R., Vol. I, pp.32-46.) 
14 
II. 
that district court in 
his counsel was ineffective for failing to timely 
move raw (Appellant's brief, pp.15-18.) However, has 
to allege a ulne issue of material fact that either his counsei's 
performance was deficient, or that he was prejudiced by any deficiency. Klein 
failed establish that the district court erred in summarily 
d this claim. 
8. 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact 
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file .... " Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76,80,57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
C. Klein Failed To Allege A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That His Counsel 
Was Ineffective With Regard To His Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must 
demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 
137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). An attorney's performance is not constitutionally 
15 
~=::::.,1 
To 
11 1, 
'U,,",n"')O of the 
1, 
1 
761, 760 P.2d 11 
1 
1999). Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do 
make out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman v. 
State, 125 Idaho 644, 649, 873 P.2d 898, 903 (Ct. App. 1994). 
In a post-conviction proceeding challenging an attorney's failure to pursue 
a motion in the underlying criminal action, the district court may consider 
probability of success of the motion in question in determining whether 
attorney's inactivity constituted incompetent performance. Boman v. State, 129 
Idaho 520,526,927 P.2d 91 916 (Ct. App. 1996). Where the alleged deficiency 
is counsel's failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, 
would not have been granted by the trial court, is generally determinative of both 
prongs of the Strickland test. lsi 
16 
is 
1 
which the Idaho 
713-71 
Court concluded that falsely 
in 
Ellington's , was published on May 27, 2011 Klein contends that his 
counsel was ineffective for a motion to raw 
Klein's guilty on idaho Supreme Court's conclusions in =~:.:::..:..:. 
in the seven days business days) between the publication of the =.:..;~=-:...: 
and the of the district court's jurisdiction to set aside or amend 
Klein's judgment (Appellant's brief, 15-18.) As the district court correctly 
determined (R VoL, II, pp.214-215), to 
assistance of counsel. Klein has failed to show either that his trial counsel was 
deficient, or that he was prejudiced by any deficiency. 
First, Klein cannot satisfy either prong of the Strickland test because he 
cannot show a reasonable probability that any timely motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea based on the Ellington decision would have been successful. Klein faced a 
high burden had he attempted to withdraw his plea following his sentencing. 
Generally, a motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea will not be granted after 
sentencing. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P,2d 281, 284 (1990); 
Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct. App. 1988). A court 
may permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing only upon a 
satisfactory showing by the defendant that withdrawal of the guilty plea is 
17 
g for many 
1 
o 
.v. 
plea 
1 1 
the 
reasons in 
L First, Klein failed to establish a Brady or other constitutional violation 
associated with his plea. Second, knowledge that the Idaho Supreme Court 
concluded CpL Rice testified falsely in another trial would have limited utility for 
most, such evidence would constitute impeachment evidence, and 
would only be useful to Klein had CpL Rice actually testified at trial. However, as 
noted, the state did not have to exclusively rely on CpL Rice's reconstruction 
report because a separate report compiled by CpL Bivins also concluded that the 
accident was caused when Klein crossed into Twitchell's lane of travel. (Plaintiffs 
exhibit 3.) Third, Klein received a favorable plea bargain from state. (See 
Vol. II, p.205.) It is unlikely that trial court in this case would have found 
"manifest injustice" would result not permitting Klein withdraw his 
18 
id.) 
as the 
that 
seem un this 
new 
days]," and 
. ) This is 
client sentenced, no direct 
a 
a 
was 
concluded, even if a 
probability of success, 
immediately aware 
district court reasoned, 
on to fully 
an appellate within seven days 
a that opinion in 
a defense attorney's 
appeal is I and counsel's 
participation in his client's case has essentially concluded. Klein thus cannot 
show that attorneys automatically fall below the Strickland objective standard of 
reasonableness where they fail to maintain a weekly review of appellate 
decisions, recognize each opinion's potential significance in cases where their 
clients have already been sentenced, conduct necessary communication with 
their client (or former client) regarding any relevant motions, and compile and 
submit relevant motions based on newly-published opinions, all within four 
business days. 
Klein has failed to show either that his trial counsel was deficient for failing 
to file a timely motion to withdraw Klein's guilty based on Ellington within four 
business days of that case's publication, or that he was prejudiced by any such 
19 
d is 
a 
is 
B. Standard Of Review 
A petitioner for post-conviction relief has burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on his claim is based. 
I.C. 57(c); Estes v. State, 111 idaho 430,436,725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986). A 
court's decision that the petitioner has not met his burden of proof is entitled to 
great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct. App. 
1990). Where the district court conducts a hearing and enters findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact if 
they are clearly erroneous, but freely review the conclusions of law drawn by 
the district court from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-77, 971 
P.2d 729-730 (1998). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be 
20 
r 97, P. 1 ,11 0 
C. 
As discussed above, it is 
attempt to second-guess trial 
sions are made upon basis 
vant law, or other shortcomings 
Idaho at 153-54, 177 P.3d 
sufficient to show deprivation 
1 1 
are 
1 
established that an appeliate court not 
ic decisions unless those deci-
, ignorance of 
of objective evaluation. 1 
assistance 
,1 P.3d 1, 
Strategic choices made after incomplete investigations are reasonable only so far 
as reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. kL 
A defendant's lawyer does not always have a duty to consult experts when the 
government is proposing to put on expert witnesses. kL; see Miller 
v. Anderson, 255 F3d 455, 459 (th Cir. 2001). ("There may be no reason to 
question the validity of the government's proposed evidence or the evidence may 
be so weak that it can be demolished on cross-examination.") 
In this case, the district court correctly concluded that Klein failed to 
establish that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate 
the accident (R., Vol. II, pp.242-250.) Klein does not challenge any of the 
district court's factual determinations. (See Appellant's brief, pp.18-27.) Those 
21 
Oleson contacted an accident 
to his 
and 
opposing expert testimony. VVhile Oleson does not recall whether 
they specifically reviewed Rice's findings, they did at least discuss 
Rice's credentials and experience. Oleson was essentially advised 
that Rice had significant qualifications and experience and that it 
would be very difficult to rebut his conclusions. Oleson also had 
prior experience with Rice on a prior unrelated matter wherein 
Oleson believed that Rice made a very good witness when 
testifying before the jury. 
At one point, Oleson had a telephone conference with Rice 
wherein they discussed [Bivins'] report and Rice's opinions 
regarding the accident. In the telephone conference, Oleson raised 
the issues and concerns he had when he first became aware of 
[Bivins'] conclusions. In Oleson's mind, Rice was able to provide 
good explanations as to the conclusions of the officers. Oleson 
then discussed with Klein his telephone call with an accident 
reconstructionist, the telephone call with Rice, and Oleson's prior 
observations of Rice testifying in a trial. Particularly, Oleson related 
that it was the opinion of the accident reconstructionist that it would 
be very difficult to refute Rice's conclusions. Oleson, however, also 
told Klein that based on his experience with expert witnesses, they 
still could probably find an expert witness who would be willing to 
refute Rice and [Bivins'] conclusions if Klein was willing to pay for it. 
22 
witnesses would 
failing to yield. Klein expressed 
County jail and felt 
determined not a 
while 
of the Custer 
defenses. Klein 
and to accept the plea 
agreement offered the prosecutor. The was later 
confirmed in a letter from Oleson to 
(R., Vol II, 
Thus, rather doing to investigate 
and to to consult or a defense reconstructionist expert, 
as Klein on appeal p.21), Oleson's trial preparation, 
including his whether pursue a defense 
reconstructionist to rebut was more 
than sufficient and did not fail below the Strickland objective standard of 
reasonableness. (R., Vol. II, pp.245-246.) 
As the district court found, Klein became familiar with Bivins' and Rice's 
accident reconstruction reports and discussed them with Rice himself. (ld.) Klein 
evaluated Rice's credibility and reliability through his own personal experiences, 
and upon consultation with a private reconstructionist. (Id.) Oleson 
communicated his efforts to Klein, with whom he discussed the decision whether 
or not to attempt to locate a defense reconstructionist in light of the strength of 
the state's case, Oleson's favorable opinion of Rice, the cost of seeking and 
finding a reconstructionist who would testify favorably to Klein, and Klein's 
23 
overcome 
respectfu lIy req uests that district court's 
denial of Klein's petition for post-conviction 
DATED this 27th day of December 2013 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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